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“HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN”:
Interview with R. D. Laing
Douglas Kirsner
R. D. Laing never gave easy answers to difficult questions. This is reflected 
in the following interview, which I conducted with him in his Belsize Park 
office in London on February 22, 1980, and which is among his most far-
reaching and nuanced interviews. The interview concerns his views on the 
human condition and civilization and provides insights into the way 
 Laing saw important philosophical issues such as ways of seeing, the na-
ture of the self, and culture. They remain very relevant today. This inter-
view was originally broadcast on Melbourne radio station 3RRR, as part 
of a series I co-directed in 1980, “The Psychoanalytic Revolution.”—D. K.
Do you see yourself as a cultural pessimist or a cultural optimist? Or 
aren’t these categories very useful in relation to the human condition?
I suppose I’m an optimist on Mondays, Thursdays and Satur-
days, and a pessimist on Wednesdays and Sundays. I haven’t got a 
philosophical position that justifies either optimism or pessimism. 
As I live them, anyway, these terms are more moods. They are of 
interest phenomenologically, but I don’t think the mood proves 
anything, and I don’t think anything proves the mood. We can 
feed a pessimistic mood with any amount of social observation, 
fact and pseudo-fact. And an optimistic mood can be fed also. I 
don’t actually think in those terms, and I can’t construct a stable 
linear view of history. History is so vast that my mind is completely 
boggled by the thought of all the different aspects of living that 
have gone into the human story so far. In what sense this is better 
than that, and how you can assess these against innumerable and 
continually changing factors, is beyond my mind to compute.
The interview was originally published in 1996 in Psychotherapy in Australia, 
2(4):55–60, and is used here with kind permission.
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A writer like Kafka seems to see the world as a prison without bars, as 
in many ways you saw the world of the schizophrenic in The Divided 
Self, or Beckett, who doesn’t seem to see any way out, or the early 
 Sartre—we’re condemned to be free at the same time as being aban-
doned. We have all these parameters in our existence, within which we 
can act. I wonder whether you feel that there are various parameters of 
our existence which could be described as the human situation?
Whether our souls or minds have any sort of autonomy apart 
from our physical existence, we live our life in a physically mortal 
frame. One thing that is certain is death. What death is, however, 
seems to me an essential, baffling mystery. Apart from observing it 
(which only tells you what you see—it doesn’t tell you what it is 
that one is looking at), the only way we could possibly know about 
it is to remember having died. And some people say they do. But 
what people say is always open to a scale of plausibility and im-
plausibility, possibility and impossibility, probability and improb-
ability. And so, what one makes of what anyone says will fit into a 
scale of credibility.
My mind works the same way as in the existential frame that 
it is apparently in the nature of man to question his being. Man is 
the being whose being is in question to himself. It doesn’t look as 
though there are any other creatures that we’ve come across, ex-
cept the human race so far, that have this peculiarity.
What is your stance on the world—your take on it—what is it like today 
for you?
My perspective is of the kind that I don’t have a model to 
which I can refer it. I can’t say it is like a prison, a womb, a tomb. 
I think it was Max Beerbohm from whom I first heard, “Life is a 
prison without bars.” If a metaphor did fit, then I wish it would 
come to mind! I would even justify my inability to say what the 
world looks like by arguing that it is in the nature of the world not 
to be “putable” into an object or an image that one can stand out 
of. There is no image that one can make, which is the totality of 
all images in the ground of the possibility of everything. You can’t 
put the infinite set of all into a model or an image that has a 
boundary on which one is on the outside looking. I don’t share 
the internal world, or the world that used to be for Giordano Bru-
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no, and up to maybe the time of Galileo, of the world as a vast 
animal, all alive. I don’t feel it in terms of a schema of any particu-
lar spatial centeredness in the world that is related to any particu-
lar theological or existential significance.
I grew up with the idea of these vast infinite spaces of Pascal. 
I don’t feel alienated. I don’t feel I strayed into this universe by 
some mistake or absent-mindedly or for some reason I’ve forgot-
ten. I feel quite at home, basically in harmony. But I’ve got a real 
sense of shuddering and terror at the way human life can turn on 
anyone. Things that can happen to people don’t look at all pleas-
ant and I’m very thankful that in my life so far I’ve been spared a 
lot of terrible things that one actually encounters. As Sophocles 
said, “Terrible is life . . .” It’s not unmitigated. I don’t have a sense 
of a continued abyss of utter end or nihilistic dissolution of all 
significance and meaning of things that I value and cherish. I 
don’t know how to account for any of this universe. In reflecting 
upon what my position seems to be, I don’t see why we would ex-
pect to be able to account for any of it.
In Freud’s theory of civilization he claims that basically we are pretty 
narcissistic and what we want is satisfaction of the pleasure principle. 
But then, à la Hobbes, we unite for a better long term goal. Civilization 
is just a compromise. Freud does see human beings as not particularly 
lovely individuals. In many ways we are basically pretty destructive, as 
well as, of course, being creative.
Oh yes. I don’t recognize in the way I look at my fellow crea-
tures and myself that I’ve hardened into a misanthropic stance. 
I’ve never gone through a period of catastrophic disillusionment, 
a soured or a jaundiced view of people. Freud claimed for himself 
that he had a “friendly attitude” to human beings. At the same 
time, he didn’t see why in any sense of the term that he could 
make any sense of, that you should be expected to love people at 
large, as he found many people quite unlovable. He disagreed 
with that injunction or command.
Also, in Civilization and Its Discontents, he brings up the short 
story by John Galsworthy “The Apple Tree.” A student on holiday 
in Wales has a brief romance with a farmer’s daughter, just before 
World War I. He is upper class, she a peasant. He goes back to fin-
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ish his holidays in Brighton. Soon the girls with their tennis rac-
quets and the rest of it capture his attention. He forgets about her 
completely. Many years later he happens to be on holiday in 
Wales. He remembers he had this affair there as a student and 
discovers that the girl committed suicide when he didn’t come 
back for her, as he had vowed he would. Freud said this story 
showed how simple natural human love is no longer possible in 
our civilization.
I don’t agree that you can culture out love. There is a lot to 
he said for one of the pleasant developments of our civilization. I 
am basing myself here, for instance on other people, social histo-
rians, like Louis Stone (in Sex, Marriage and Family History from 
1500–1800 with aperçus about the nineteenth century). He makes 
a very strong case that the development of our industrial civiliza-
tion, money circulation and the dissolution of the romantically 
cherished structures that went 200–300 years ago opened out 
space for women and men to develop something like a friendly 
relationship to each other, to be able to look at each other, to 
choose each other out of personal taste to a considerable extent, 
to develop on their own avowal and take their destiny in their 
hands between themselves, to take the decision to live together if 
they wanted, to part if they wanted, to have children if they want-
ed. I like all that sort of thing. I am a sufficiently “corrupt” (I say 
that ironically) product of my times that I actually prefer the 
thought of living now than any other time I can think of. Just for 
the little time since the end of World War II in Europe, however 
long that is going to last, has been a remarkable period of com-
parative peace. Comparative, I mean, just in this particular loca-
tion on the planet or anywhere where people haven’t got the 
knives out, or the helicopters, or the machine guns—where peo-
ple have a chance to sit down and get on with living a peaceful life 
and making something of it, I mean, that’s the sort of place I 
would like to be.
But a lot of people would see you as a herald of a sort of non-alienated 
life to come in a totally different society. They’ve read The Politics of 
Experience and taken it that we are all half-crazed, half people in a 
really crazy world. Is there a question of being misunderstood?
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I suppose it depends on the tone of voice in which one says 
that, and the look in the eyes—whether it is said in a frenetic, 
frantic way or whether it is said in some other tone of voice. If we 
take the world’s well-known spiritual teachers from the Buddha to 
the  Judeo-Christian tradition, to the Greek tradition and the Is-
lamic tradition, it’s said all over the place that most people by any 
rigorous standards are pretty daft. We don’t give any credit to 
even the state of mind of people—our own great-great-great-
grandparents—we think we have to make allowances for it, they 
didn’t know any better. Have a look at how many women were 
burned a year in Europe for years—only about 20 generations 
back—apparently about 100,000 a year is a low conservative esti-
mate out of a population of about 6,000,000. An incredibly large 
number of women were picked up in the middle of the night 
from their beds, trundled along in carts at 3 am—it could happen 
here or anywhere—these guys were going around picking up 
women and putting them into dungeons and torturing them and 
burning them. Any student in the first year of a philosophical 
course is expected to begin to realize that the unreflective ordi-
nary state of mind, as soon as one looks upon it, is practically 
bound to discover innumerable, epistemological errors—deep 
programmed epistemological errors—so I don’t think I’m saying 
anything unusual there.
You have been taken as that, though, haven’t you?
I was taken by quite a lot of people who raved. The educated 
people divided into two camps over The Politics of Experience. Some 
of them who were on the inner side of education knew the echoes, 
resonances and reverberations of what I was saying. But they 
deeply resented that thousands of people read that in that form 
for the first time—that was their introduction to all that. They 
read me before they had read Sartre or Hegel or before they had 
even heard of Kierkegaard, or before they had ever thought of 
reading Plato or Aristotle. Psychoanalysts did not like the idea 
that thousands of intelligent students were reading for the first 
time (at fourteen or earlier) these thoughts about Freud or psy-
chiatry before they had read anything else, getting misled and 
misinformed and led astray. And the other side of those people 
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who were positioned to make that critical judgment loved it, of 
course. They liked that because they felt my point of view was sym-
pathetic with theirs.
You actually did chime in with the mood of the 1960s, characterized by 
the Dialectics of Liberation Conference.
Yes. Most of The Politics of Experience was written in the late 50s 
and early 60s, and given in lectures, in professional and academic 
circles. Then, without me knowing that it was happening, a whole 
year of American college students picked it up and it became a 
campus best-seller. Well, it never had that fate anywhere else. And 
of course since the Americans with their Tibetan Book of the Dead, 
Tim Leary and then The Politics of Experience—it was all over the 
world. The American students, what could they have read like 
that? Herbert Marcuse is not the same as that. He’s not an existen-
tialist, he is a Marxist-Freudian.
Sartre had never got to that generation in America and 
 Camus was now too old for them. So here was quite a young guy 
in his thirties just writing. But all this passed me by. I didn’t re-
alize it had been happening until I came back from India. I re-
alized that for 3–4 years there must have been a lot of stirring 
up of all sorts of issues that people were debating and that my 
contribution had become part of that conversation and that de-
bate. But I found it extremely disheartening that any bit of 
meaning in what I’d intended to say had got overgrown with so 
many weeds of misunderstanding, deliberate distortion. Or if 
not misunderstanding, in some cases then construing the words 
of what I said in quite a legitimate way, but not in the way I in-
tended.
Many people would regard you as a radical. For example, in writing 
The Politics of Experience you were one of the first people who took 
experience seriously as a central motif. Yet you don’t cut it off from our 
interactions with our fellow human beings. Related to that of course is 
your work in psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. I know that’s not something 
you particularly want to be associated with.
I don’t see how anyone could see me as a radical in a political 
activist sense. And I certainly would not say that I don’t like to be 
KIRSNER 367
thought of as radical. It’s a nice word to bask under the warmth 
of, like “profound” and so forth.
In talking about the place that one gives experience to, it is 
really a matter of taking our human life cycle from conception to 
death. There are certain critical moments in that life cycle physi-
ologically and as adults we experience . . . It is very difficult to say 
what one means by “experience”! There is an attitude of mind 
that simply seems to say that what we as human beings experience 
doesn’t matter at all. It’s got no metaphysical significance to speak 
of. It’s mainly a nuisance as far as scientific truth is concerned. 
Practically no experience can be believed naively.
When it is believed it’s almost as though what one said is that 
experience is a psychosis of matter—that experience is itself an-
other countable aberration in the universe that knows nothing of 
it, and gets on its own way apparently without it. And yet it is only 
through it that we know anything at all. So there’s a complex 
problem of different orders of this scientific methodology. The 
way one looks and what one sees and what comes into view. And 
what is revealed or concealed according to how one looks at any-
thing at all. 
I don’t know the base word for a “looking at” that has been 
described by Foucault as this look of observation, inspection, 
monitoring and surveillance—we “look at.” This is the look with 
which we look at people under certain circumstances. My dentist 
gives me nitrous oxide and a local anaesthetic and as far as he is 
concerned he is not out of touch with me as a human being, but 
he is giving all his attention to an objective problem which I am 
paying him to, I hope, ablate, subtract, eliminate, strip of his look 
any subjectivity that he has that is not going to contribute to his 
skill at drilling into my root. I am not asking for personal feelings 
or for him to be aware of the phenomenology of dentistry. I am 
not asking for that at all. And that’s fine.
But then it applies to the way I die, it’s applied to the way my 
children are taught to speak and move. It’s applied all over the 
place. And I dislike that impinging, transgressive spread and that 
encroachment on the on-goings that are being looked at and ex-
amined and dissected and controlled and started and stopped in 
that way. There’s no way you can look at anyone that way, it’s an 
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instrumental look, and I don’t want be at the receiving end of that 
unless I am able to keep that look as a slave that doesn’t become 
my master, that I’m in control of that look. I can use that look, I 
can pay someone to look at me in that way and stop looking at me 
in that way when I want them to stop. He can’t take over my whole 
life with that look. He can’t take over something as profoundly 
important in every sort of way symbolically, socially and physically 
and the way I want to live my body or the way a woman wants to 
have a baby, I find that that’s an insufferable transgression. So 
that’s one side of things that unites in my mind as a common fac-
tor in the domain of psychiatry, the domain of medicine in general 
in the domain of midwifery and obstetrics and all this field of than-
atology, I suppose thanatology is here to stay now—no wonder.
But that sensibility has been with you since the beginning—that the cri-
tique of standard institutional psychiatry has been exactly of that na-
ture. It’s been an attack on a knowledge which is not guided by love, 
which is really interested only in control and manipulation.
I do not in the slightest claim to be a rare human being, in so 
far as I’m capable of feeling. I’m not saying that scientists and psy-
chiatrists who exclude this mode of being with and feeling with 
from their scientific work are incapable of it in their personal 
lives. But this sort of psychiatrist has developed a stance to his pro-
fessional work whereby he feels that he’s almost professionally 
culpable if he doesn’t look at people that way. The way doctors 
learn how to do that is to start off with dead dogfish and move on 
to a dead human being, a corpse. Then we kill a frog and put it 
through all sorts of numbers from smashing its head to cutting its 
head off and pithing its spine and seeing all the different parts 
twitch. Then you eventually cut it all up, into bits that are still 
twitching. And then you have a bit of muscle or a bit of nerve 
from this frog. And then you learn how nerves and muscles work 
and then you move to patients in hospital and you start studying 
diseases and you can get a ten pound frog muscle that twitches, 
you start testing reflexes in neurological conditions. And in the 
movement from muscle nerve twitch to the tendon reflex no per-
son has entered the horizon—there’s no human being. There’s a 
neurological condition, you’re simply looking at this bit of some-
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thing with a tendon doing things to a piece of stuff. In some mys-
terious way there is a person attached, in some way connected, if 
only legally.
But at any rate there’s a patient there. It’s neurology, you’re 
studying the nervous system and you’re not really concerned with 
the personality of someone who’s got pneumonia, except to give 
them a tranquillizer if they won’t lie quiet. There’s all sorts of ob-
jectives, studies that you can do. You can classify behavior even as 
an objective thing that people now suffer from Type A or Type B 
behavior, people with different sorts of heart conditions. You now 
suffer from your own conduct, your conduct has become reified, 
objectified. The agent has been abolished, and by reversal has be-
come pacified, and people now suffer from pathological syn-
dromes of behavior. So, instead of Manfred Bleuler or Ted Lidz in 
their descriptions of having a girl in their clinic or office who’s 
scared stiff of them, they are doing an interview with acute excite-
ment and a mute catatonic schizophrenic whose nervous system 
needs to be toned down because there is too much sensual arousal.
From the moment of entering into the whole system they’ve 
never even seen a person there. When I started psychiatry, I 
thought it was a branch of neurology! I was interested in the brain, 
my first job was in a neurosurgical unit. I was into this: how do 
these disorders of the body affect the mind? I wanted to know 
how the brain affected the mind. So I looked at people in this 
way. I never thought there was any other way to do it though I 
hadn’t lost my fellow feeling like the rest of my fellow students. 
But when I came to a patient I de-listed the complaint. I did an 
examination trying to find out what was the matter. And what was 
the matter was some sort of delineable if possible, pathological 
condition or syndrome, or set of conditions. So I went through all 
this stuff with people in psychiatry and as you quickly discover, 
you’ve got to discover it yourself. You examine them all over back-
side forward, upside down and so forth and there is nothing the 
matter with them physically and no pathological stuff.
When it came to people who are schizophrenic, I looked at 
people like that and there was nothing the matter with them. I 
couldn’t make this out. Apart from what the textbooks say text-
books go into primary, secondary or first rank symptoms of schizo-
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phrenia what psychiatrists in actual clinical practice go through in 
diagnosing someone who is schizophrenic is that it is someone 
who is different. They never diagnose anyone who they felt was 
essentially the same as them as schizophrenic. It is a way of ex-
pressing, as I said, in The Divided Self, that disjunction. I think that 
for every sociologist, as well as psychiatrists, and anthropologists, 
that’s abundantly clear that it is a disjunction that generates the 
diagnosis. But the disjunction is of a peculiar order. I can’t under-
stand this person who is inaccessible to me. As Jaspers says, it is on 
the other side of an abyss—his psychic life is different from mine. 
I repeatedly found that I felt I could understand this person per-
fectly well with no particular difficulty. I didn’t see how or why 
other people would draw that line where they did. I still don’t 
know why, actually.
It doesn’t mean to say there isn’t an abyss. If someone is on 
the other side of an abyss he doesn’t cease to be a human being 
because I can only wave at him across a vast abyss, because he 
speaks another language, has made up a language of his own, is in 
a different inner space, is on a trip, or freaked out, or lost or con-
fused. Now, the psychiatrists say the reason why that communica-
tion has broken down to me and you is that there is something 
the matter with you which makes you unable to communicate 
with me, or with anyone for that matter. Or yourself properly. 
And so that is why I can’t understand you. It’s because you’re not 
capable of making yourself understood and you’re not under-
standable. Verstehen therefore is out of the question. It’s a com-
plete error of reading of the situation to apply Verstehen modalities 
to a situation that is only explainable, it is not understandable.
Again, I am amazed that non-psychiatrists still have to be in-
timidated by psychiatry. All the hermeneutics of this problematic, 
how psychiatrists are allowed to get away with being vested with 
such power over such a crude issue! I mean, that would be all 
right if it was said in conversation as an insult to someone. “You 
are just making no real sense at all, and it’s not even good for you 
to be allowed to speak. Your mind is so confused. And the reason 
why it is so confused is that I can’t understand a word of what 
you’re saying and that’s that.” In decent human dialogue if I feel 
that about someone, I don’t feel impelled then to work them over 
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with therapeutic vigor, rigor and zeal. Well, that’s all right with 
me, I don’t expect to understand everyone. Possibly there are 
quite understandable reasons (if I knew what they were) why he 
doesn’t want to be understood. I don’t have to stretch my imagi-
nation too far to imagine someone in that position. What I can-
not, however, do is move into a sympathetic or empathetic mode 
while remaining in a “looking at” mode it is a contradiction of 
terms. The interesting thing is, that lack of understanding, ap-
plied with that look, in fact, extends essentially to everyone, not 
really just schizophrenics. If you think that schizophrenia is a 
name that a psychiatrist gives to someone who can’t understand, 
then Bleuler was quite prepared to say that he couldn’t under-
stand 90% of people who are tinged with schizoid or schizophren-
ic symptoms. It is quite often said that if psychiatrists could diag-
nose people at will, 1 in 10 of any group of people would be 
definitely down the hatch. I mean, how can this be taken seriously?
[Thomas] Szasz says that you really champion the schizophrenic, that 
you think that it’s wonderful to go through voyages of discovery, of inner 
space, and they are really better people in a sense than the usual.
Since The Politics of Experience I haven’t given a long exposi-
tion in a book of my own position, but I have done many inter-
views in which I have said again, I think that some people, who for 
a variety of reasons get in dislocated and social space, getting out 
of position, being insufferable, not breaking the law in any gross 
way but act in such a way that no one can stand them any longer. 
This is a point that Hugh Crawford has particularly made and he 
is absolutely right. No one was ever sent away to hospital for 
schizophrenia if the company that they were keeping wanted 
them just in any ordinary way to be around. Either frightening, or 
worrying or alarming or putting people off. . . . So there is no 
question that there are people who get into positions of being di-
agnosed as schizophrenic or go into unusual states of mind or so 
forth. People get diagnosed as schizophrenic or whatever state of 
mind, in terms of their likeability in general, or in terms of the 
vices and virtues, in terms of the Robert Burns sort of thing, “A 
man’s a man for all that,” whether you’re daft of not, I don’t think 
they’re any better or worse than you or me. I said this is degrad-
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ing, as it is. Sociologically, it stigmatizes, it places someone down 
and it strips a person of their total legal rights to their own body, 
to their own time, to their own money, to their own words, to 
their own utterances, to their own thoughts, etc. etc. So I agreed 
with [Erving] Goffman and other people, yes this is a degrada-
tion, this is degrading. It invalidates the person quite explicitly 
and turns them into (in an obvious, justifiable pun), at the same 
time an invalid and an invalidated person.
So I said I’m doing that. So the screams went up from some 
quarters that I was idealizing schizophrenics, as Nathan Acker-
man, the American family therapist, said, “You’re a schizophrenia 
lover, Ronnie, that’s why they can’t stand you!” So I’m just going 
to say that I’m going to treat this person on equal terms with me. 
If he behaves in a way that is insufferable to me, I’ll deal with that 
accordingly. I might even deal with it by the use, or the power to 
use the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Though I’ve never had occa-
sion to move in that type of setting, I am glad to say, for years now.
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